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ENFORCING EUROPEAN CORPORATE 
COMMITMENTS TO FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION 
BY LEGAL AND INDUSTRIAL ACTION IN THE 
UNITED STATES: ENFORCEMENT BY 
INDUSTRIAL ACTION 
Lance Compaj and Fred Feinsteinft 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Many European multinational corporations embrace the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights and United Nations human rights covenants. 
They declare support for declarations and conventions of the International 
Labor Organization (ILO), industrial relations guidelines of the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, principles of the 
United Nations Global Compact, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union, and other international labor rights documents. 
In similar measure, many European firms active on a global scale 
adopt corporate social responsibility principles, policies, programs, and 
codes of conduct on workers' rights. They join Corporate Social 
Responsibility (CSR) Europe, the Global Reporting Initiative, the European 
Business Ethics Network, the Caux Roundtable, the Consumer Goods 
Forum, the World Business Council for Sustainable Development, and 
other European CSR bodies. They deal forthrightly with workers' 
representatives in European trade unions and works councils, often 
celebrating the "social dialogue" that marks labor relations in Europe. 
In all these instruments and settings, workers' freedom of association -
the right to organize trade unions and to bargain collectively - is a 
centerpiece of human rights and corporate social responsibility pledges. 
European companies appear to hold a deep commitment to workers' human 
rights through their publicly declared statements and promises. 
But what happens when these companies set up shop in the United 
States, where the law is less protective of workers' freedom of association? 
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In some cases, European companies in the United States act directly 
contrary to ILO conventions and other international instruments, adopting 
practices common in the United States but anathema in Europe. In other 
cases they engage in threats and coercion that violate U.S. labor law as well 
as international standards.1 
Some provisions of U.S. labor law violate international human rights 
standards on their face. For example, U.S. law allows employers to 
permanently replace workers who exercise the right to strike over economic 
issues, such as wages and benefits. U.S. law also allows employers to 
mount one-sided aggressive workplace pressure campaigns against 
workers' organizing efforts, marked by mandatory "captive-audience" 
meetings and one-on-one supervisor-employee meetings scripted by anti-
union consultants, without comparable opportunities at the workplace for 
employees to hear from union representatives or for pro-union workers to 
convey their views to fellow workers. 
Contrary to international standards, U.S. law excludes millions of 
workers from labor law protection: farm workers, household domestic 
workers, low-level supervisors, so-called "independent contractors" who 
are actually dependent on a single employer for their livelihood, and many 
more. The ILO's Committee on Freedom of Association has found further 
violations in weak and unavailable remedies for workers and unbalanced 
remedies favoring employers in the U.S. labor law system.2 
Other U.S. legal provisions comply on their face with international 
standards but fail in application. For example, it is unlawful to threaten or 
to discharge workers covered by labor laws for trying to form a union. It is 
unlawful to engage in "bad faith" collective bargaining. But as noted 
above, these provisions are not adequately enforced in a remedial scheme 
marked by delays and slap-on-the-wrist penalties that fail to deter or punish 
violators, another breach of international labor rights. 
1. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, A STRANGE CASE: VIOLATIONS OF WORKERS' FREEDOM OF 
ASSOCIATION IN THE UNITED STATES BY EUROPEAN MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS (2010) 
[hereinafter A STRANGE CASE]. 
2. For ILO decisions finding U.S. labor law not in conformity with international standards, see 
ILO Committee on Freedom of Association, Complaint Against the United States, Case No. 1543, 
Report No. 278 (1991) (permanent striker replacement); ILO Committee on Freedom of Association, 
Complaint Against the United States, Case No. 1523, Report No. 284 (1992) (union representatives' 
access to the workplace; secondary boycott strictures); ILO Committee on Freedom of Association, 
Complaint Against the United States, Case No. 2227, Report No. 332 (2003) (denial of remedies to 
immigrant workers); ILO Committee on Freedom of Association Complaint Against the United States 
(Case No. 2460), Report No. 344 (2007) (North Carolina public employee bargaining rights); ILO 
Committee on Freedom of Association, Complaint Against the United States, Case No. 2524, Report 
No. 349 (2008) (exclusion of low-level supervisors); ILO Committee on Freedom of Association, 
Complaint Against the United States, Case No. 2741, Report No. 362 (2011) (New York State public 
employees' right to strike). 
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In large part as a result of the weaknesses in U.S. law and practice, 
many employers respond to workers' organizing and bargaining efforts with 
aggressive, even ruthless campaigns of interference, intimidation, and 
coercion to break them. Such campaigns are commonplace among U.S. 
companies that operate in a corporate culture imbued with strong anti-union 
beliefs and practices. Such practices violate international standards and 
often even U.S. law itself. Unfortunately, otherwise respected European 
multinational firms are joining their ranks. 
Nothing in U.S. labor law requires European (or any other) employers 
to aggressively campaign against workers' organizing efforts, break strikes 
with permanent replacements, or otherwise fail to meet international labor 
standards and their own proclaimed values and codes of behavior. But 
some of the largest and best known European employers in the United 
States seem to forget their sensitivity to social responsibility concerns and 
their much-publicized commitments to workers' rights. They break with 
home-based policies that are relatively respectful of workers' organizing 
efforts and collective bargaining and that view "social dialogue" as a core 
element of industrial relations. Instead, they exploit the loopholes and 
shortcomings in U.S. labor law contrary to international human rights 
standards. Sometimes they go even farther, committing unfair labor 
practices in violation of elements of U.S. law that are in line with 
international standards. 
Other articles in this volume examine whether European companies' 
commitments to freedom of association can be enforced in U.S. courts 
using common law contract theories. For example, a cause of action might 
be found in companies' promises of respect for workers' organizing and 
bargaining rights if they constitute an implicit contract or an implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Another discussion is whether 
international framework agreements (IFAs) can be treated as enforceable 
collective contracts. Our presentation approaches the "enforcement" 
question from a different angle: whether trade unions can enforce European 
companies' international commitments through industrial action. 
We believe it is important to discuss industrial action as one way to 
enforce commitments to abide by international labor standards in part 
because of the challenges of "hard" law enforcement, not only in an 
international context but also in the enforcement of domestic labor policies. 
Because of the challenges presented by "hard" enforcement of labor policy 
in both the domestic and international context, it is important to examine 
the dynamics that initially motivate the adoption of IF As and other 
commitments to abide by international labor standards as an important 
aspect of their enforcement. 
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What unions and other advocates do to encourage enterprises to enter 
into these agreements in the first place should likewise be an important 
means of motivating them to carry through with the enforcement of such 
agreements. Agreements to abide by international codes of conduct and to 
enter into framework agreements arise at least in part out of an 
understanding that it is a proper and necessary way to do business. The 
challenge is to carry forward this understanding into effective enforcement 
of the agreements. Industrial action plays a part in the adoption of such 
codes and agreements, and in this Article we examine the movement from 
adoption to enforcement. 
Part II lays the groundwork for case studies to follow, trying to define 
what we mean by "industrial action" for purposes of this discussion. Part 
III presents case studies that involve classic forms of industrial action such 
as strikes, stoppages, and boycotts that might be applied when European 
companies violate international standards in the United States. 
Part IV applies a broader definition of "industrial action" to cross-
border union campaigns called variously strategic campaigns, corporate 
campaigns, comprehensive campaigns, and the like, suggesting that these 
create models for enforcing European companies' commitments to freedom 
of association. Part V offers concluding observations and analysis and 
questions for further study. 
II. A CAUTIONARY START 
From a technical legal perspective, not much new can be added to 
what we already know about enforcement of European corporate 
commitments to freedom of association in the United States by means of 
industrial action (as distinct from enforcing a contractual obligation as 
discussed earlier in this session). Here we take "industrial action" in the 
classic industrial relations sense: strikes, stoppages, picketing, boycotts, 
slowdowns, overtime bans, work-to-rule, and other forms of workers' 
withholding their labor to hamper management's business. 
Any industrial action in the United States takes place within the four 
corners of the U.S. labor law system. It does not matter if the parent 
company is European, and it does not matter what commitments to freedom 
of association it has made. In many, even most cases, a firm's international 
commitments will not affect compliance or noncompliance with U.S. law 
when cases involve issues of: 
• Protected versus unprotected activity; 
• Section 8(a)(1) prohibited conduct versus § 8(c) permitted conduct; 
• Majority status versus minority status; 
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• Mandatory versus permissive subjects of bargaining; 
• Economic strikes versus unfair labor practice strikes; 
• Temporary versus permanent replacements; 
• Primary versus secondary actions; and, 
• Inducing/encouraging/forcing/requiring versus publicity-other-
than-picketing/truthful advising. 
Let us take a hypothetical company based in Europe called EuroCo 
Ltd. We go to its website and find a declaration that says: "In keeping with 
our commitment to freedom of association and social dialogue under ILO 
principles, we pledge to honor ILO core labor standards and core 
conventions, bargain collectively with trade unions chosen by our 
employees, to engage in information-sharing and consultation with our 
works councils, and to welcome two employee representatives onto our 
board of directors." 
EuroCo Ltd. bargains with three unions, each representing one-third of 
its hourly employees. The company meets quarterly with its Works 
Council to provide information and to consult on the state of the business. 
One trade unionist and one representative chosen by non-union white-collar 
staff sit on the board of directors. 
Now let us assume that EuroCo Ltd. has a U.S. subsidiary called 
EuroCoUSA and consider these questions: 
• If EuroCoUSA is unorganized, could a union that signs up one-
third of the facility's workers compel management to bargain "with 
a union chosen by your employees"? 
• If management says "No," would it be lawful for the union to 
picket the workplace demanding recognition? 
• If a union did represent EuroCoUSA employees, could a dissident 
minority faction that secedes from the union compel management 
to bargain with it, again as a "trade union chosen by your 
employees?" 
• Would it be lawful for the union to strike over a demand for 
quarterly information sharing and consultations with management 
on the state of the business? 
• Would it be lawful for it to strike to gain a seat on the board of 
directors? 
• If the union strikes over strictly economic issues and EuroCoUSA 
hires permanent striker replacement, could the union claim it is an 
unfair labor practice strike because permanent replacements violate 
ILO standards? 
• Would it be lawful for the union to set up pickets at EuroCoUSA's 
suppliers or customers to halt deliveries because management 
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violated its European parent company's commitments on freedom 
of association by hiring permanent replacements? 
• In sum, could the union take industrial action to enforce EuroCo 
Ltd.'s commitments to international labor standards on freedom of 
association? 
As we know, U.S. labor law disputes are normally decided on a case-
by-case basis taking into account unique facts and circumstances. We, 
however, do not think we go too far out onto a limb by suggesting that the 
answers to the above questions are "No." Unions need majority status to 
compel management to bargain.3 Section 8(b)(7) of the National Labor 
Relations Act (NLRA) prohibits organizational picketing. National Labor 
Relations Board (NLRB) decisions make it virtually impossible for 
subgroups of a certified bargaining unit to carve themselves away into a 
new bargaining unit. A union is entitled to information needed for 
bargaining or to process grievances, but gaining information about the 
general state of the business and future plans is not a mandatory subject of 
bargaining, nor is gaining a seat on the board of directors. 
The permanent replacement doctrine in U.S. labor law precludes any 
claim by an American union that its economic strike is converted to an 
unfair labor practice strike because management is violating international 
norms. Perhaps most forcefully, harsh strictures against secondary boycotts 
prohibit what would otherwise be a powerful form of industrial action to 
enforce international commitments.4 
The striker replacement issue provides a stark example. Many 
European companies adopt principles, charters, codes, policies, and other 
statements proclaiming their commitment to the ILO core labor standards. 
Sometimes they do so directly, and sometimes they incorporate ILO core 
standards by reference to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, the U.N. 
Global Compact, codes of conduct to which companies subscribe, and other 
instruments that embrace the ILO core. 
Freedom of association heads the list of ILO core labor standards. The 
ILO's Committee on Freedom of Association has found that U.S. labor 
3. Charles J. Morris has made a powerful argument to the contrary, but his position has not been 
adopted by U.S. labor law authorities. See CHARLES J. MORRIS, THE BLUE EAGLE AT WORK: 
RECLAIMING DEMOCRATIC RIGHTS IN THE AMERICAN WORKPLACE (2004), 
4. An important exception can be found in the Railway Labor Act, which does not contain the 
prohibition on secondary action. This opens the field to such action in the railroad and airline industries. 
For treatment of the latter, see Stephen B. Moldof, Union Responses to the Challenges of an 
Increasingly Globalized Economy, 5 RICH. J. GLOBAL L. & BUS. 119 (2005) (discussing actions of 
pilots' unions at KLM, Delta, Air France, and Cathay Pacific; Prof. Moldof also discusses several of the 
same cases we recount here). 
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law's permanent striker replacement doctrine violates workers' freedom of 
association.5 If EuroCo Ltd.'s freedom of association policy declaration 
says, "We honor the ILO core labor standard on freedom of association," its 
U.S. subsidiary, EuroCoUSA, should say: "We promise not to use 
permanent replacements for economic strikers because of EuroCo's 
commitment to ILO core labor standards." 
We are likely to wait in vain for such a statement. In case studies of 
real, not hypothetical, European companies in the 2010 Human Rights 
Watch report A Strange Case: Violations of Workers' Rights in the United 
States by European Multinational Corporations, U.S. managers hauled 
employees into captive audience meetings and told them, "If you vote for a 
union and the union pulls you out on strike for better wages and benefits, 
we can and we will hire permanent replacements to take your jobs, and you 
will remain on a waiting list to return only if and when a replacement 
vacates a position. Vote NO to avoid permanent replacement." In some 
instances, European companies went ahead and hired permanent 
replacements, contradicting their parent companies' commitments to 
international standards. 
On these facts, a union has no basis for an unfair labor practice charge 
under U.S. labor law. Where European employers violated their 
international commitments but not U.S. law - such as threatening or using 
permanent replacements - they suffered no legal consequences. 
Here are other examples drawn from the Human Rights Watch report 
of European companies' actions in the United States contrary to their 
international commitments: 
• Robert Bosch declares its commitment to ILO standards on 
freedom of association, but in violation of those standards 
threatened to permanently replace workers who exercised the right 
to strike. 
• Deutsche Telekom has a Social Charter based on ILO standards and 
the OECD Guidelines statements on freedom of association, but T-
5. In a 1991 report on a complaint against the United States filed by the AFL-CIO on the 
permanent-replacement doctrine in U.S. law, the ILO Committee on Freedom of Association concluded: 
The right to strike is one of the essential means through which workers and their 
organisations may promote and defend their economic and social interests. The Committee 
considers that this basic right is not really guaranteed when a worker who exercises it 
legally runs the risk of seeing his or her job taken up permanently by another worker, just 
as legally. The Committee considers that, if a strike is otherwise legal, the use of labour 
drawn from outside the undertaking to replace strikers for an indeterminate period entails a 
risk of derogation from the right to strike which may affect the free exercise of trade union 
rights. 
See Int'l Lab. Org., Comm. on Freedom Ass'n, Complaint Against the Government of the United States 
Presented by the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO), 
Report No. 278, Case No. 1543, para. 92 (1991). 
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Mobile management spied on workers engaged in organizing and 
defined "employees engaging in group behavior" and "talking 
about rights" as dangerous activity to be immediately reported to 
management. 
• Deutsche Post has a code of conduct based on the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, ILO conventions, and the UN Global 
Compact, but its DHL management threatened and discriminated 
against workers who sought to exercise the rights set forth in these 
instruments. 
• Saint-Gobain proclaims "Principles of Conduct respecting the 
philosophy and spirit of the Global Compact," but U.S. 
management refused to bargain with workers' chosen union about 
key terms of employment. 
• Sodexo says, "Since its creation, Sodexo has always recognized and 
respected trade unions," but it threatened, interrogated, and fired 
workers who tried to form trade unions in the United States. 
• Tesco says it "is committed to upholding basic Human Rights and 
supports in full the U.N. Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
and the International Labour Organisation Core Conventions," but 
its U.S. Fresh & Easy management set a priority of "maintaining 
non-union status" and stifled workers' organizational activity. 
• Group4 Securicor holds up a "Business Ethics Policy" committed 
to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, but Wackenhut 
management threatened, spied on, and fired workers exercising 
rights established in the UDHR. 
• Kongsberg Automotive cites the U.N. Global Compact, ILO core 
labor standards, and OECD guidelines in its corporate social 
responsibility pledges, but U.S. management in Van Wert, Ohio, 
offensively locked out union members while negotiations were still 
ongoing and brought in replacement workers. 
• Gamma Holding signed a code of conduct that embraces the right 
to organize under ILO Conventions 87 and 98, but its management 
at National Wire Fabric in Star City, Arkansas, hired permanent 
replacements, in contravention of ILO standards, to take the jobs of 
workers who exercised the right to strike. 
• Siemens points to the U.N. Global Compact, the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, the ILO Tripartite Declaration, and 
the OECD Guidelines as the underpinnings of its corporate social 
responsibility program, but for years U.S. management in Monroe 
County, New York, unlawfully refused to bargain with workers. 
So does this mean we have nothing to say about enforcing European 
corporate commitments to freedom of association by industrial action in the 
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United States? On the contrary. Part III discusses concrete cases that 
involved the threat or the exercise of industrial action to enforce workers' 
organizing and bargaining rights. Part IV offers a wider definition of 
"industrial action" going beyond classic tactics to include other forms of 
collective activity to enforce firms' international commitments.6 
III. THREE CASE STUDIES INVOLVING REAL "INDUSTRIAL ACTION" 
Classical industrial action means strikes, work stoppages, boycotts, 
overtime bans, sickouts, "work-to-rule," and other collective steps to win 
workers' objectives by directly hampering the employer's business. 
Staying with our hypothetical EuroCoUSA facility, a perfect template 
would involve violations by U.S. management of EuroCo Ltd.'s workers' 
organizing and bargaining rights under international standards, but not 
under U.S. law, and workers respond with industrial actions in the United 
States and in Europe to enforce the company's commitments to freedom of 
association. 
We are not aware of a case perfectly on point. But we can draw from a 
variety of cases to create a composite picture of industrial action that could 
be brought to bear on European companies' commitments to freedom of 
association. Most involve efforts by U.S. trade unionists reaching out to 
foreign counterparts to support American workers' organizing and 
bargaining efforts. Here are three such cases involving either the threat or 
the use of cross-border industrial action, including strikes and secondary 
boycotts, to support workers' organizing and bargaining efforts.7 
A. Trico Marine 
1. Background 
Headquartered in Houston, Texas with an operational base in Houma, 
Louisiana, Trico Marine Services provides services and supplies to oil rigs 
6. A linguistic note, "enforcement by industrial action" is not quite the right formulation. Labor 
law authorities enforce. Industrial action involves self-help efforts by workers and their unions without 
turning to the authorities or to courts for enforcement. We might better express what we discuss here as 
"persuasion" or "compulsion" by industrial action. To stay in step with the theme of the conference, we 
are going to continue using the term "enforce," understanding that we mean persuading or compelling 
(usually by pressure tactics) a European company to live up to its commitments to international 
standards on workers' freedom of association. 
7. We focus on cases derived from labor disputes originating within the United States. Thus, we 
do not include international industrial action on behalf of British dock workers locked out by their 
employers in 1997, a case study treated magisterially by James Atleson, The Voyage of the Neptune 
Jade: Transnational Labour Solidarity and the Obstacles of Domestic Law, in LABOUR LAW IN AN ERA 
OF GLOBALIZATION (Joanne Conaghan et al. eds., 2002). 
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in the Gulf of Mexico. In 2000, a coalition of AFL-CIO maritime unions 
called Offshore Mariners United (OMU) launched an organizing campaign 
among Trico boat crewmembers. 
Trico management responded with a typical U.S. style anti-union 
campaign, hiring consultants to script captive audience meetings and 
dismissing key leaders among employees. It involved dismissals of ship 
officers who qualified as supervisors, one of them (as alleged by the union) 
because he refused to oppose the workers' organizing efforts. No recourse 
could be had under the NLRA since these employees were excluded from 
protection of the Act. 
The Company also denied requests by OMU representatives for access 
to the employer's premises to meet with workers. ILO standards insist that 
employers should provide access to union representatives so that workers 
can hear from them at the workplace (always in a manner not interfering 
with work). But U.S. labor law does not provide for access. The union had 
no basis for an unfair labor practice charge. 
In addition to these workplace anti-union tactics, Trico management 
also joined the local Chamber of Commerce and other local businesses in 
creating an intensive community campaign against the OMU. Measures 
here included taking out newspaper and radio ads about "outsider" unionists 
threatening the well being of the local economy and pressuring (according 
to the union) or requesting (according to the Chamber) local businesses and 
homeowners to post anti-OMU posters prominently on their property. 
2. International Reach 
Trico Marine Services was not a just a local supplier to Gulf of Mexico 
rigs. Trico was (and is) a large multinational corporation with subsidiaries 
providing similar services for British and Norwegian oil rigs in the North 
Sea, Brazilian oil rigs in the Atlantic, and other offshore oil-drilling sites. 
In fact, a majority of the Company's revenues came from overseas 
operations, and full 40% came from its North Sea operations with Norway's 
oil company, Statoil. 
Mindful of the Company's global reach, the OMU developed relations 
with trade union counterparts in countries where Trico had overseas 
operations. A delegation from the Norwegian oil workers union (NOPEF) 
visited Houma in 2001 and saw management's and the Chamber's anti-
union campaign up close. They met with workers, who told them of 
management's anti-union meetings and propaganda, and toured the 
community where they saw the sea of anti-OMU posters. Local police 
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moonlighting as company guards chased the visitors away from work yard 
entrances. 
Moved by their experience, NOPEF representatives promised to look 
for ways at home to support the organizing struggle in Louisiana (as we 
shall see in discussing the Coastal Stevedoring case below, it is important 
that the NOPEF group initiated this effort; there is nothing in the record 
suggesting that the OMU or the AFL-CIO importuned them to take action). 
3. The Boycott Hammer 
As it turned out, NOPEF had a hammer. While secondary boycotts are 
strictly prohibited under U.S. law, Norwegian law permits secondary 
boycotts. The law applies a "proportionality" test, and the union must seek 
preliminary review and approval by a Norwegian court to undertake a 
secondary boycott. 
In 2001, NOPEF sought judicial permission under Norwegian law to 
boycott the North Sea operations. A key issue in the Norwegian case was 
whether U.S. labor law and practice conformed to ILO freedom of 
association norms. Under Norwegian law, the union's boycott would be 
legal only if it could show systematic U.S. violations of ILO standards. 
NOPEF and Trico's Norwegian counsel each called expert witnesses from 
the United States to testify whether U.S. law and practice violate ILO core 
standards on freedom of association. The Norwegian court's finding that 
U.S. law failed to meet international standards would let the NOPEF 
boycott proceed. 
Rather than us characterizing the case further, Trico's CEO went to the 
heart of the matter in his plaintive testimony to a congressional committee: 
For almost two and a half years Trico and its employees have been the 
subject of an intense and harassing corporate campaign to organize 
Trico's mariners by a U.S. federation of maritime unions called The 
Offshore Mariners United, or OMU, which is supported by the AFL-
CIO 's Center for Strategic Research, Department of Corporate Affairs. 
Trico was chosen as the target company, I believe, because the OMU 
and its international allies had to focus their resources on one company 
and because of Trico's status as a public corporation and its overseas 
operations - particularly in Norway. Public corporations and 
corporations with foreign subsidiaries are more susceptible to labor 
union pressures and harassment during disputes or organizing 
membership drives.... 
On October 18, 2001, the Norwegian Oil and Petrochemical Workers 
Union, known as NOPEF, a large and powerful union which represents 
the dock and platform workers in the North Sea, filed a lawsuit under 
Norway's boycott statute against Trico Supply.... NOPEF filed the suit 
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at the call of the largest federation of transportation unions in the world 
- the International Transport Workers Federation (ITF) - of which it is a 
member. The case is lodged in the small town of Volda, and a three 
week trial is scheduled to begin on November 4. NOPEF seeks court 
pre-approval of an announced boycott against Trico Supply's vessels 
operating in the North Sea. The only issue at trial in Norway will be 
Trico's conduct in the U .S . . . . 
Secondary boycotts are illegal under the U.S. National Labor 
Relations Act, but may be legal in Norway if deemed fair and without a 
disproportionate impact.... NOPEF is asking the district court in Volda 
to rule that Trico's compliance with U.S. law - the National Labor 
Relations Act (NLRA) - does not offer a defense to the boycott since 
U.S. labor law does not adequately protect U.S. citizens.... 
NOPEF is contending that the NLRA is defective by the standards of 
the International Labor Organization Conventions 87 and 98, unratified 
by the U.S., that deal with the right to organize and freedom of 
association. NOPEF also contends that U.S. labor law does not meet 
"European humanistic standards." 
Following the trial, a ruling could be issued that U.S. labor law, the 
National Labor Relations Act, does not sufficiently protect its own 
citizens and that Trico's compliance with U.S. law offers no defense and 
that NOPEF's planned boycott against Trico's vessels in the North Sea 
is legitimate. I have been told that no court from a first world nation, or 
for that matter, any nation, has ever passed judgment on the legitimacy 
of U.S. labor law. Such a ruling would become precedent in Norway. 
Any U.S. company operating in Norway, but involved in a domestic or 
international labor dispute or membership drive, could be boycotted 
even when in compliance with U.S. labor law - without a 
predetermination trial. 
Since the vast majority of U.S. corporations operating in the offshore 
oil and gas industry in both the Gulf of Mexico and in the North Sea are 
non-union in their U.S. Gulf operations, a successful boycott against 
Trico will likely spawn more boycotts against U.S. companies that 
operate in both locations. 
Such a decision rejecting U.S. labor law could also impact U.S. 
corporations throughout the world. In addition to potential boycotts, the 
decision could be used by foreign companies against U.S. companies 
competing for business. It could be argued that a particular piece of 
foreign business should not be awarded to a U.S. company because U.S. 
law has been found not to protect U.S. citizens adequately by a 
competent European court.8 
8. See Testimony of Thomas E. Fairley, President & Chief Exec. Officer, Trico Marine Services, 
Inc., before the House Committee on Education and the Workforce, U.S. Congress, Oct. 8, 2002. 
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4. Trico's NLRB Charge 
Trico Marine filed an unfair labor practice charge against the OMU 
alleging an unlawful secondary boycott in violation of § 8(b)(4) of the Act. 
Trico built its argument on an agency theory, insisting that NOPEF was 
acting as an agent of the U.S. union in threatening a boycott. Therefore, the 
OMU could be held liable for the actions of its agent, violating the 
prohibition on secondary boycotts. 
Citing precedent in the Coastal Stevedoring case (discussed below), 
the NLRB General Counsel's office dismissed the charge "because there is 
insufficient evidence of a joint venture or agency relationship between 
OMU and NOPEF."9 The GC also noted that: 
[T]here is no evidence here that NOPEF's threats were directed against 
persons "engaged in commerce" . . . none of the allegedly unlawful 
conduct was initiated in the United States by OMU, and there is no 
evidence that the Norwegian unions and alleged neutrals are engaged in 
trade with companies located in the United States.... Absent such 
evidence, NOPEF's boycott threat may well be lawful as not affecting 
interstate commerce, even if OMU were liable for it.10 
5. Headed for Trial - and Settlement 
NOPEF overcame motions to dismiss and other procedural hurdles, 
and the case was set for trial at a district court. Without tracing all the 
arguments, the key issue was whether U.S. labor law complied with, or ran 
afoul of, ILO conventions 87 and 98 on freedom of association and 
protection of the right to organize. A court ruling that U.S. law violated 
international standards would allow NOPEF to launch a boycott of Trico 
operations in the North Sea. 
A former Democratic member of the NLRB and another analyst, the 
author of the 2000 Human Rights Watch Unfair Advantage report, were set 
to serve as NOPEF's expert witnesses for the proposition that U.S. law 
violates international standards. Trico called a former Republican member 
of the NLRB and the chief U.S. employer representative to the ILO, 
Edward Potter, to serve as expert witnesses for the company. 
Ironically, the union's main documentary submissions included, in 
addition to the Human Rights Watch Unfair Advantage report, Edward 
Potter's own 1984 book Freedom of Association: The Right to Organize 
and Collective Bargaining—The Impact on U.S. Law and Practice of 
9. See NLRB Division of Advice, Advice Memorandum, Offshore Mariners United (Trico 
Marine Operators, Inc.), Case 15-CC-832 (Sept. 27, 2001). 
10. Id. 
648 COMP. LABOR LAW & POL'Y JOURNAL [Vol. 33:635 
Ratification of ILO Conventions No. 87 & No. 98. In what is still "the 
Bible" for U.S. management on this issue, the author argued against U.S. 
ratification of the ILO's freedom of association conventions. He detailed 
the many ways in which U.S. law is not in compliance with the conventions 
and concluded that ratification would amount to bypassing Congress to 
amend U.S. labor law. 
On the day the trial opened, NOPEF and Trico Marine Services settled 
the case, calling off the clash of experts and lifting the boycott hammer. 
Under the settlement agreement, Trico promised to halt its use of what the 
unions called coercive tactics, such as threats and dismissals of organizing 
leaders. Although a boycott did not materialize, the Trico case signaled the 
potential impact of ILO core standards in the United States. As the 
company's president noted, similar cases could arise in the future as trade 
unions increase their cross-border solidarity work.11 
6. Applying an Analogy 
What lessons can we draw from the Trico Marine case? It involved an 
U.S. company claiming to comply with U.S. law but arguably violating 
international standards, rather than a European company that had promised 
to adhere to international standards. But the case could have led to an 
international secondary boycott based on the company's failure to meet 
international standards. 
By analogy, many European companies that engage in U.S. 
management-style anti-union campaigns that arguably breach the 
companies' international commitments could be vulnerable to international 
industrial action. And not just in Norway. Most European countries'labor 
laws permit some form of secondary industrial action under varying 
conditions (often, as in Norway, involving a "proportionality" test).12 In 
laymen's terms, this means a court would not let a big strong union crush a 
small weak secondary employer, but might would let a big strong union 
take on a big strong secondary company whose actions affect the primary 
dispute. 
11. The organizing drive later ended without an election or other resolution. The unions say that 
the legacy of Trico's earlier tactics had a continuing effect of undermining the organizing campaign. 
Trico says that employees were not interested in union representation. 
12. See JURI AALTONEN, METALWORKERS FED. FlN., INTERNATIONAL SECONDARY INDUSTRIAL 
ACTION IN THE E.U. MEMBER STATES (1998) (on file with authors); STEFAN CLAUWAERT, 
INTERNATIONAL/ TRANSNATIONAL PRIMARY AND SECONDARY COLLECTIVE ACTION - AN OVERVIEW 
OF INTERNATIONAL, EUROPEAN AND NATIONAL LEGISLATION (2002). 
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B. Dropping the boycott Hammer in Japan 
1. Background 
The boycott hammer dropped in another case—the Coastal 
Stevedoring case, which involved a dispute between the ILA and two non-
union stevedoring companies on the east coast of Florida in early 1990s.13 
Japan was a major importer of Florida citrus fruits, and Japanese 
shipping companies were using the services of the two non-union 
stevedoring companies (Coastal and Canaveral) that were competing with 
ILA-organized stevedoring companies. The International Longshoremen's 
Association (ILA) the East Coast dockworkers' union, had made efforts to 
organize employees of Coastal and Canaveral, but management in both 
firms had resisted union organization with aggressive anti-union campaigns 
permitted under § 8(c) of the NLRA - arguably in violation of international 
standards, but legal under U.S. law. 
The ILA reached out to the Japanese stevedoring unions for support. 
The facts about what the ILA did to enlist the support of the Japanese 
unions and the results of those efforts were not in dispute in the ensuing 
litigation. The stipulated facts were recounted in the D.C. Circuit court 
decision examined in more detail below: 
Before the 1990-91 citrus export season, ILA representatives visited 
Japan and met with representatives of several Japanese unions to express 
concern that Japanese importers were using the services of nonunion 
stevedores at Port Canaveral and Fort Pierce, and to request assistance in 
their ongoing dispute with nonunion companies. In response, the 
Japanese unions asked numerous stevedoring companies, citrus 
importers, and shipping companies to ensure that all citrus fruit they 
imported from Florida was loaded by union workers. Further, the 
Japanese unions warned that they would refuse to unload any fruit 
loaded by nonunion workers.14 
The court stated that in addition to their visit, an ILA official wrote a 
letter to officials of the Japanese stevedoring union reiterating their request 
for help. The letter stated, "Your further support in denying the unloading 
and landing of these picketed products in your country will also be most 
helpful to the members of the [ILA] and organized labor in the United 
States which supports our effort."15 In the ensuing litigation, a key question 
was whether such requests (and the positive response of Japanese union) 
13. The ultimate case name was International Longshoremen's Ass'n, AFL-CIO v. N.L.R.B., 56 
F.3d 205 (1995) and, on remand to the Board, International Longshoremen's Association, AFL-CIO 
(Coastal Stevedoring Co.), 323 NLRB No. 178 (1997). 
14. AFL-CIO, 56 F. 3d at 208. 
15. Id. 
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created an agency relationship in which the actions of the Japanese union 
could be imputed to the ILA. 
Japanese labor law does not contain the same strictures against 
secondary boycotts as does § 8(b)(4) of the NLRA.16 Acting lawfully in 
Japan, the Japanese stevedoring union told Japanese importers that its 
members would not unload fruit from a boat loaded in nonunion Florida 
ports. A key Japanese importer directed that fruit be loaded by ILA-
represented workers in union ports in Florida, and other importers followed 
suit. As a result, much of the fruit shipped to Japan during the 1990-1991 
season was diverted from nonunion ports and loaded by union stevedoring 
companies instead. 
The nonunion companies, Coastal and Canaveral, lost their Japanese 
business. Afterward, the ILA wrote a letter to the Japanese unions thanking 
them for their supportive action. This further implicated the agency issue: 
was the union's letter a "ratification" of an agency relationship? 
2. The Secondary Boycott Charge 
The targeted stevedoring companies filed charges with the NLRB 
alleging that the ILA's actions in reaching out to the Japanese unions 
violated the NLRA's prohibition against unlawful secondary pressure. The 
NLRB's General Counsel issued a complaint charging that the ILA's 
actions were a violation of § 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) of the Act. The General Counsel 
sought to prohibit the ILA from threatening various parties neutral to its 
labor dispute with Coastal and Canaveral. In this case, the actual threats 
were made by Japanese unions, but the General Counsel relied on an 
agency theory to impute the threats to the ILA. 
If upheld, the General Counsel's complaint would require the union to 
repudiate its written solicitation of aid from the Japanese unions. After 
issuing the complaint, the General Counsel sought an injunction under § 
10(1) of the Act, which requires such a step upon issuance of a complaint. 
The U.S. District Court in Florida granted the injunction, and the 11th 
Circuit Court upheld the District Court's ruling.17 The Circuit Court 
decision reasoned that under a "liberal application of agency concepts 
appropriate in the labor context, a contractual right to control and direct the 
performance of another is not required to impose responsibility under 
16. Oversimplifying—in the post-World War II occupation era Japan got the Wagner Act without 
the Taft-Hartley Act, in large part because U.S. unions, especially the United Auto Workers, acted as 
key labor advisors to the occupying U.S. administrators. 
17. Dowd v. Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n, 781 F. Supp. 1565 (M.D. Fla. 1991), affd, 975 F.2d 779 
(1 lth Cir. 1992). 
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section 8(b) where an employer or union has encouraged or requested 
another to engage in unfair labor practices on its behalf."18 
The NLRB decided the underlying case in 1993 and held the ILA had 
violated § 8(b)(4)(ii)(B). The Board said that the ILA "acting through the 
Japanese Unions, threatened, coerced or restrained shipping agents, 
shipping companies, citrus exporters, citrus importers, the Canaveral Port 
Authority, and other persons engaged in commerce, who are neutral to the 
dispute between the Respondent and Canaveral and other nonunion 
stevedoring companies[.]".19 
3. Appeal and Reversal 
Faced with substantial financial liability for losses suffered by the 
nonunion stevedoring companies, the ILA entered an appeal to the District 
of Columbia Circuit court. The union's argument focused on the agency 
issue, stressing that it exercised no control over actions of its Japanese 
counterpart. Alongside the ILA's argument, a labor rights NGO filed an 
amicus brief focusing on international labor standards. Here are some 
portions of the amicus brief: 
The weight of international law on the issue of trade union solidarity 
appeals and action is more tolerant than the U.S. regime. The 
International Labor Organization (ILO) is the principal international 
body that treats these issues. It has developed a body of international 
labor law based on 75 years of institutional experience. 
ILO Convention 87 expressly recognizes the international dimension 
of trade union activity, with a guarantee of unions' right to join 
international organizations. The ILO's Committee on Freedom of 
Association has stated: 
In order to defend the interests of their members more effectively, 
workers' and employers' organizations should have the right to 
form federations and confederations of their own choosing, which 
should themselves enjoy the various rights accorded to first-level 
organizations, in particular as regards their freedom of operation, 
activities and programs. International solidarity of workers and 
employers also require that their national federations and 
confederations be able to group together and act freely at the 
international level. 
Applying ILO principles, the NLRB should not penalize a U.S. union 
for exercising its right of freedom of association in requesting help from 
a Japanese union.... 
18. 975F.2dat785. 
19. Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n, 313 N.L.R.B. 412,418 (1993). 
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Regarding trade union sympathy appeals and action under Convention 
87, the ILO is clear: 
Sympathy strikes, which are recognized as lawful in some 
countries, are becoming increasingly frequent because of the move 
towards the concentration of enterprises, the globalization of the 
economy and the delocalisation of work centers. While pointing 
out that a number of distinctions need to be drawn here (such as an 
exact definition of the concept of a sympathy strike; a relationship 
justifying recourse to this type of strike, etc.), the Committee of 
Experts considers that a general prohibition on sympathy strikes 
could lead to abuse and that workers should be able to take such 
action, provided the initial strike they are supporting is itself 
lawful. 
Congressman Hartley's 1947 House Report on the Labor Management 
Relations Act made clear Congress's concern about secondary boycotts: 
"Illegal boycotts take many forms The effects of boycotts upon 
business, and particularly upon small commercial enterprises in 
metropolitan centers, such as New York, Philadelphia, and Pittsburgh, 
have often been disastrous." Similarly, Congressman Landis, 
commenting on the secondary boycott provisions of what became the 
Taft-Hartley Act, noted: "As a result of these secondary boycotts many 
of our citizens have been deprived of the deliveries of milk, bread, meal, 
fruits vegetables, and essentials of life." 
If the citizens of Tokyo, Osaka and Yokohama go without Florida 
grapefruit because of actions by Japanese dockworkers, that is a matter 
for Japanese labor law and the Japanese authorities to regulate.20 
In a decision written by Judge Harry Edwards (a prominent labor law 
professor before ascending to the bench), the D.C. Circuit reversed the 
NLRB ruling. The court held that the NLRB's central conclusion in the 
case, finding the Japanese unions acting as agents of the ILA, could not be 
sustained. Instead, the court found the ILA had no actual or apparent 
authority or control over the Japanese unions and therefore the Japanese 
unions could not be seen as agents of the ILA. As Judge Edwards stated: 
Here, the ILA exercised no control over the conduct of the Japanese 
unions. To the contrary, the ILA and the Japanese unions are completely 
independent entities, bound together only by the fact that both seek to 
further the goals of organized labor worldwide. We discern nothing in 
the law of agency to support a theory transforming one union into the 
agent of another based upon the spirit of labor solidarity alone.21 
20. See Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n v. N.L.R.B., Brief of Amicus Curiae International Labor 
Rights Education and Research Fund, February 10, 1995 (on file with authors). 
21. 975 F.3d at 213 (Edwards, J.). 
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The D.C. circuit remanded the case to the NLRB for "for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion." The Board in turn held that the 
D.C. Circuit court opinion "precludes a finding that the Japanese unions 
were in any way an agent" of the ILA.22 
The Edwards decision remains the law of the D.C. Circuit and the 
NLRB has not had a case before it with these issues since the Coastal 
Stevedoring case. The 11th Circuit decision upholding the issuance of an 
injunction, before the Board decided the underlying case, also not been 
challenged since it was issued. 
4. Applying the Analogy 
Under the reasoning of the D.C. Circuit Court decision, U.S. unions 
are not limited by the NLRA from appealing to foreign unions to undertake 
secondary industrial action in their own counties - action that likely would 
be unlawful secondary activity were it to occur in the United States. 
Applying this reasoning when European companies resist union organizing 
in the United States, or hire permanent striker replacements, or otherwise 
act lawfully under U.S. labor law but contrary to international standards, 
U.S. unions could ask European unions to take industrial action against 
them (or indeed when companies violate U.S. law). 
The European trade unions would be bound by their countries' laws on 
secondary action. As noted above European secondary boycotts laws are 
generally more accommodating than the NLRA's § 8(b)(4), though they 
still have limitations - most commonly, a proportionality test, and in 
Norway, a requirement for preapproval by a court of boycott action. Under 
the D.C. Circuit's Coastal Stevedoring decision, the U.S. unions would not 
face secondary boycott liability at home for European labor unions' actions 
in their home. 
C The 1997 Teamsters Strike at UPS 
International staffers with the International Brotherhood of Teamsters 
(IBT) and the International Transport Federation organized secondary 
action in Europe and other countries in the union's 1997 strike against UPS. 
It was mostly symbolic action such as leafleting and rallies without work 
interference. But some forms of genuine industrial action took place. 
The Teamsters represented 185,000 UPS workers in the United States 
who struck in the summer of 1997. In addition to normal bargaining 
22. Int's Longshoremen's Ass'n, AFL-CIO, 323 N.L.R.B. 1029, 1031 (1997). 
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concerns over salaries and benefits, the union was especially concerned 
about growing use of part-time workers with no benefits. A key union 
demand on management was movement of thousands of part-timers to full-
time employment. 
A year before the strike started, Teamsters international affairs staffers 
began laying a foundation for cross-border action. The London-based 
International Transport Federation (ITF), one of the global union 
federations related to the then-International Confederation of Free Trade 
Unions (ICFTU, now the International Trade Union Confederation 
(ITUC)), formed a World Council of UPS unions, chaired by a Teamster 
director. The Council identified UPS air hubs and distribution centers 
throughout Europe and in many other countries, and planned a World 
Action Day for May 22, 1997 -just before negotiations opened between the 
IBT and UPS. 
The ITF's World Council claimed 150 World Action Day job actions 
or demonstrations at UPS sites around the world. They mostly involved 
leafleting and rallying without extending to work stoppages, but at some 
locations in Spain and Italy, the actions turned into half-day stoppages. 
World Action Day was a dress rehearsal for what followed when the 
Teamsters' strike actually got underway. In England, workers at a newly 
organized UPS distribution center staged a "sick-out" in support of UPS 
strikers. In France, Germany and Holland, UPS unions took strike votes 
and were preparing to strike on August 21 when IBT and company 
negotiators settled the conflict on August 19. 23 
Again, we offer this case as an imperfect analogy suggesting what 
might be possible in the industrial action arena. UPS is a U.S. company, 
not a European company. Workers struck for economic and job security 
goals. As an "economic strike" under U.S. labor law, it did not involve 
management practices that could implicate international standards on 
freedom of association. Nor had UPS at that point made any commitments 
invoking international standards. Still, the solidarity actions by European 
and other foreign unions reflect a collective cross-border response that 
could be brought to bear on a European company violating workers' rights 
in the United States today. 
23. For a fuller account, see Andrew Banks & John Russo, The Development of International 
Campaign-Based Network Structures: A Case Study of the IBT and ITF World Council of UPS Unions, 
20 COMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 453 (1999). For an employer-side view of corporate campaigns, see 
JAROL B. MANHEIM, THE DEATH OF A THOUSAND CUTS: CORPORATE CAMPAIGNS AND THE ATTACK 
ON THE CORPORATION (2000). 
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IV. EXPANDING THE DEFINITION: STRATEGIC CAMPAIGNS AS INDUSTRIAL 
ACTION 
A definition of "industrial action" going beyond classic forms such as 
strikes, boycotts, sickouts, overtime bans, work-to-rule, etc. opens the field 
to examination of other collective action strategies. Going under various 
names that include "corporate campaign," "comprehensive campaign," and 
"strategic campaign," one such strategy involves trade unions' efforts to 
build alliances with not only trade union counterparts in other countries, but 
also with friendly nonlabor entities such as churches, human rights and civil 
rights groups, community organizations, and others. Such labor-community 
alliances then bring pressure to bear on a targeted firm at any points of 
perceived vulnerability. 
Advocates might take aim at environmental violations, safety 
violations, misclassification of employees as independent contractors and 
other forms of "wage theft," corporate misgovernance, management self-
enrichment, board of directors' malfeasance, questionable financial 
practices, alleged use of "sweatshop labor" abroad, and other causes for 
criticism besides anti-union practices. Many unions have built "strategic 
research" departments to ferret out such information, and then use it to 
launch "naming and shaming" campaigns of public exposure. In some 
cases, where companies depend on public authorities for licensing or 
contracting approvals, labor advocates challenge their applications or bids 
based on the company's documented bad behavior in other areas. 
In recent year, unions have highlighted the potential risk to 
shareholders of badly behaving companies. Many unions have created 
"capital strategies" departments to analyze companies' operations and 
finances and to work with pension fund and socially responsible investment 
fund administrators on shareholder proposals and shareholder actions at 
companies' annual meetings. 
In many such campaigns, the U.S. practices of European companies 
come under scrutiny. In cases examined below, cross-border collaboration 
among trade unions did not take the form of classic industrial actions like 
strikes and secondary boycotts. But they did involve collective action and 
support measures that got results. 
A. First Student 
The Teamsters' First Student organizing campaign is an example of an 
American union benefiting from a corporate responsibility code adopted by 
a parent company in Europe. Working closely with the European trade 
union that represented the parent company's workforce at home, the 
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Teamsters used the firm's own proclaimed corporate responsibility 
statements to achieve an effective neutrality agreement that led to 
substantial union organizing gains. 
In 2004 the Teamsters and the Service Employees International Union 
(SEIU)24 launched a nationwide campaign to organize the school bus 
drivers employed by First Student, the largest operator of privately 
contracted school bus services in the United States with more than 60,000 
U.S. employees. First Student was the U.S. subsidiary of First Group, Ltd., 
the United Kingdom's largest rail and bus transportation company. 
Based in Aberdeen, Scotland, First Group's domestic workforce was 
represented by the Transport and General Workers Union (TGWU). Under 
pressure from the TGWU, First Group had adopted a corporate social 
responsibility policy that referenced international human and labor rights. 
Top company management made declarations at Annual General Meetings 
(AGMs - annual shareholders' meetings) pledging full support for ILO core 
labor standards and ILO conventions on freedom of association. 
In the United States, however, First Student management failed to 
apply these principles. Instead, they launched aggressive, threat-filled anti-
union campaigns wherever workers tried to organize, contrary to 
international standards and to U.K. management policy (and often in 
violation of the NLRA). 
A key part of the Teamster campaign to organize the bus drivers at 
First Student was to convince the parent company to honor its corporate 
responsibility policy in the United States. Working closely with the 
TGWU, the Teamsters engaged in an extensive campaign that included 
meetings, public forums, and other activities involving financial backers of 
the company, members of Parliament and others. The activities took place 
in both the United States and England and helped to focus attention on 
problems with Student First's operations in the United States, including 
management's failure to live up to the company's corporate responsibility 
policy. 
In an initial response to the campaign, First Group management 
promised to remain neutral in union organizing campaigns. When U.S. 
management ignored the promised neutrality pledge, the Teamsters 
sponsored reports by academics documenting the aggressive anti-union 
campaign being waged at First Student facilities across the country, in clear 
violation of the neutrality pledge and in violation of international human 
rights standards. 
24. By mutual and amicable agreement with the Teamsters, the SEIU decided not to pursue 
organizing school bus drivers, so the Teamsters carried the campaign forward. 
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These reports and other concerns were publicized in England and 
presented at the annual stockholder meeting of the parent company in 
Scotland by the Teamsters and the TGWU.25 Throughout the multiyear 
campaign, the TGWU worked closely with the Teamsters in organizing and 
promoting a wide range of activities, including initiating a parliamentary 
inquiry into First Student's behavior in the United States. 
Responding to these forms of industrial action in the broad sense we 
are using it here, First Student adopted a strong neutrality policy with an 
effective enforcement mechanism in 2008. Since then, more than 20,000 
bus drivers in First Student locations around the United States have 
succeeded in forming unions (most with the Teamsters, though the policy 
applies across-the-board and has benefited workers who joined other 
unions, too). In 2011, First Student and the Teamsters reached a national 
"master agreement" for IBT-represented bargaining units.26 
B. Using the OECD Guidelines: the Brylane Case 
1. Background 
U.S. unions have often turned to the OECD and its Guidelines for 
Multinational Enterprises in labor disputes with European companies in the 
United States. Here we recount just one such case, showing how unions 
can achieve their goals by creative use of such international mechanisms. 
In an expanded version of this Article to follow, we may add other OECD 
cases with other interesting and instructive features. 
a. The OECD 
Like most international bodies, the OECD lacks real enforcement 
power. But it provides a "soft law" forum in which corporations can be 
held accountable for violating workers' rights. 
The OECD began as the "rich man's club" among international 
organizations in 1961. For a quarter-century, membership was limited to 
the United States and Canada, wealthy Western European countries, and 
25. In one dramatic exchange at the 2007 AGM, First Group's chairman said he was advised by 
U.S. managers that the company had settled most unfair labor practice complaints issued by the General 
Counsel of the NLRB with a "non-admission clause," meaning that critics could not impute unlawful 
conduct to the company. At this point a former General Counsel of the NLRB, accompanying the trade 
unionists' delegation, explained the process for finding "merit" in an unfair labor practice charge and 
how issuance of a complaint does imply unlawful conduct, notwithstanding a later settlement. 
26. See Ryan Gray, Teamsters, First Student Sign "Historic Agreement" for School Bus Driver 
Labor, SCH. TRANSP. NEWS, June 6, 2011, http://www.stnonline.com/home/latest-news/3417-teamsters-
first-student-sign-historic-agreement-for-school-bus-driver-labor. 
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Japan, Australia, and New Zealand. Since then Mexico, Korea, and Turkey 
became OECD members, as did E.U. member states. Later some of the 
most advanced "countries in transition" from the socialist bloc - the Czech 
and Slovak Republics, Poland, and Hungary, gained OECD membership. 
Besides its now thirty member countries, the OECD maintains formal 
"partnerships" with dozens of other nations. Among these nonmember 
partners, eleven countries also have signed on to the Guidelines for 
Multinational Enterprises. They are Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Estonia, 
Egypt, Israel, Latvia, Lithuania, Peru, Romania, and Slovenia. 
The OECD is a coordinating "think tank" for member countries.27 A 
large professional staff at OECD headquarters in Paris collects and analyzes 
data to produce comparative research reports and policy recommendations. 
It focuses on economic policy, but with a wide definition of economics. 
Besides economic policy, OECD departments also treat education, 
environment, labor and employment, science and technology, agriculture, 
finance and tax policy, and other fields. 
b. TUAC, BIAC, and the NGO Community 
Organized labor and employer groups have formal, permanent roles in 
official OECD advisory groups: the Trade Union Advisory Committee 
(TUAC) for labor and the Business and Industry Advisory Committee 
(BIAC) for employers. In the United States, the AFL-CIO and the U.S. 
Council for International Business play key roles in these two advisory 
committees. 
For decades the TUAC and BIAC were the only nongovernmental 
groups allowed to participate in OECD affairs. They still maintain this 
official privilege, but in recent years the OECD has also opened dialogue 
with environmentalists, human rights advocates, sustainable development 
activists, global trade and finance watchdog groups, and other civil society 
organizations in an annual OECD Forum. 
The opening to civil society was a hard win. Pressure from activist 
groups, especially in a successful 1997-1998 campaign to kill the OECD's 
proposed Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI), forced the 
organization to come out of its Paris-based shell and engage civil society.28 
27. See James Salzman, Decentralized Administrative Law in the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development, 68 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 189 (2005). A former OECD official, 
Salzman describes it as "a management consulting firm for governments." Id. at 191. 
28. See id. at 196-201 (calling the anti-MAI campaign "a watershed experience for the OECD"). 
The MAI would have codified among OECD countries NAFTA-style investor-state rules allowing 
international investors to sue governments for actions that lowered the value of their investments. For a 
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c. The OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises 
The OECD first adopted its Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises 
in 1976 and last revised the Guidelines in May 2011.29 A mix of events in 
the 1970s prompted the OECD to create the Guidelines: 
• Revelations in 1975 Senate hearings of American-based ITT 
Corp.'s payments to coup plotters in Chile (leading to the Pinochet 
military dictatorship) and other corporate skullduggery put pressure 
on the United States and other "home country" OECD governments 
to halt abuses by their multinational firms in "host country" 
nations.30 
• Trade unions were concerned about many multinational companies' 
interference with workers' organizing rights and practice of 
threatening "runaway shops" (as they were then called - the term 
"outsourcing" is more common now) to force down wages and 
working conditions in collective bargaining contexts.31 
• The United Nations was considering proposals from developing 
countries to put new conditions on foreign direct investment in the 
name of a "new international economic order," an initiative fiercely 
resisted by OECD countries and multinational companies.32 
The OECD saw a voluntary set of guidelines as a way to preempt 
stronger action. The OECD Guidelines call on foreign-investing companies 
to act responsibly in human rights, environment, consumer protection, 
science and technology, antitrust, taxation and employment, and industrial 
relations. While it is a classic "soft law" mechanism focusing on voluntary 
compliance rather than strict legal enforcement,33 the Guidelines provide a 
valuable mechanism for promoting high standards. 
discussion of the labor implications of the MAI, see Lance Compa, The Multilateral Agreement on 
Investment and International Labor Rights: A Failed Connection, 31 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 683 (1998). 
29. ORG. ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., OECD GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES 
(1976) [hereinafter GUIDELINES], available at http://www.oecd.org/document/39/0,3746,en_2649_34 
889_1933095_1_1_1_1,00.html. 
30. See Multinational Corporations and United States Foreign Policy: Hearings before the 
Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations (the 
"Church Committee"), 94th Cong., 1st sess., 381-86 (1975). 
31. See Richard J. Barnet and Ronald E. Miiller, Global Reach: The Power of the Multinational 
Corporation (Simon & Schuster, 1974). 
32. See Adeoye Akinsanya & Arthur Davies, The Third World Quest for a New International 
Economic Order: An Overview, 33 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 208 (1984). 
33. The first clause in the Guidelines bluntly states: "The Guidelines are recommendations jointly 
addressed by governments to multinational enterprises. They provide principles and standards of good 
practice consistent with applicable laws. Observance of the Guidelines by enterprises is voluntary and 
not legally enforceable." GUIDELINES, supra note 29. For an extended discussion of the "soft law" 
concept, see Dinah L. Shelton, Soft Law, in HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (David Armstrong ed., 
2008). 
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d. Guidelines on Employment and Industrial Relations 
Chapter V of the OECD Guidelines covers labor concerns. First, 
companies must honor the core labor standards of the International Labor 
Organization (ILO): respecting workers' organizing and bargaining rights, 
halting child labor and forced labor, and ensuring nondiscrimination in the 
workplace. Beyond the ILO core standards, the Guidelines call for 
information and consultation with workers' representatives, safe and 
healthy jobs, advance notice of workplace closures and efforts to mitigate 
their effects, refraining from outsourcing threats in contract negotiations, 
and other good faith measures in labor relations. 
e. The Guidelines' Complaint Mechanism and the Role of 
National Contact Points 
Each OECD country has a National Contact Point to receive and 
handle complaints under the Guidelines. The NCP is usually an office in a 
relevant department or ministry, sometimes part of an inter-agency setup. 
In the United States, the NCP is located an office housed in the State 
Department's Bureau of Economic, Energy and Business Affairs. The 
Bureau is part of the International Finance and Development unit in the 
State Department's Office of Investment Affairs. 
The Guidelines' procedures give wide latitude to NCPs on how to 
handle complaints. NCPs "contribute to the resolution of issues that arise 
relating to implementation of the Guidelines in specific instances." They 
"offer a forum for discussion . . . to deal with the issues raised." They "offer 
good offices to help the parties involved to resolve the issues."34 
NCPs may "facilitate access to consensual and non-adversarial means, 
such as conciliation or mediation, to assist in dealing with the issues." 
Finally, if the parties involved do not reach agreement, NCPs can "issue a 
statement, and make recommendations as appropriate, on the 
implementation of the Guidelines."35 
2. The Brylane Case 
a. The OECD Complaint 
A complaint under OECD guidelines can be relatively informal, 
compared with a complaint in civil litigation. But the complaint must still 
34. GUIDELINES, supra note 29. 
35. Id 
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be carefully crafted by counsel familiar with international labor law and 
OECD proceedings. This was the case in the trade union UNITE's 
campaign to help hundreds of warehouse employees at the U.S. subsidiary 
of a French multinational company after local managers launched a typical 
U.S. management-style antiunion campaign against workers' organizing 
efforts. 
Brylane, Inc. is the U.S. distributor subsidiary of the French firm 
Pinault-Printemps-Redoute (PPR) (the parent company of Gucci and other 
famous brands as well). PPR issued declarations of support for ILO core 
labor standards and respect for workers' rights in its facilities around the 
world. But when employees at a Brylane warehouse in Indiana tried to 
form a union in the early 2000s, Brylane responded with a standard U.S. 
management-style anti-union campaign, bringing in consultants to advise 
them on captive-audience meetings, supervisor-employee one-on-one 
meetings, and other settings in which management smeared the union as 
scoundrels interested only in collecting dues, told workers that bargaining 
starts at zero and they could lose everything they had, that if the union pulls 
them out on strike the company will hire permanent replacements, and other 
exercises of "employer free speech" under the U.S. labor law system. 
b. The International Campaign 
UNITE filed a complaint to the U.S. NCP in July 2002 arguing that 
company tactics ran afoul of the OECD Guidelines. As with many "soft 
law" forums, the efficacy of the OECD procedure lies less in its legal 
formalities than in the opportunity it provides for concrete cross-border 
solidarity among trade unions and allied NGOs. The OECD Guidelines 
provided a triggering mechanism for a wider international campaign in the 
Brylane case. 
On their side of the Atlantic, French and Dutch unions representing 
PPR workers in France and Holland filed counterpart complaints with the 
NCPs of those countries, driving home the point that the labor dispute in an 
Indiana warehouse was now an international affair. The chairman of the 
TUAC weighed in with a call for strong, prompt action by all governments 
to put a stop to the anti-union tactics of PPR's U.S. warehouse 
management. 
At the same time as the NCP filings, the AFL-CIO Office of 
Investment organized a forum in New York for fifty European and U.S. 
stock analysts and institutional investors to present findings on serious 
weaknesses in PPR's corporate governance practices. The AFL-CIO 
presented a report by the French corporate responsibility research center 
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CFIE {Centre Frangais d Information sur les Enterprises) criticizing PPR's 
governance, and also aired reports of illegal "sweatshop" conditions at 
factories producing apparel for PPR in India, Indonesia, Philippines, and 
Thailand. 
The French and Dutch trade union actions did not stop with the OECD 
complaint. Along with NGO allies, they mounted demonstrations at PPR 
headquarters in Paris and at Gucci headquarters in Amsterdam protesting 
Brylane's interference with workers' organizing at the Indiana warehouse. 
At the same time, French union leaders met privately with top PPR 
management urging a solution to the crisis at its U.S. subsidiary. 
c. The Victory 
The combined European pressure led to PPR's top management 
instructing U.S. managers to halt their anti-union campaign and agree to a 
"card check" procedure for establishing majority representation status. A 
solid majority of workers quickly chose union representation, and in May 
2003, Brylane and UNITE reached agreement on a three-year contract 
providing a 9% wage increase, substantial benefits improvements, and a 
strong health and safety committee. 
Union advance did not stop there. Based on the Brylane campaign, 
UNITE targeted Swedish retailing giant H&M for its next campaign to 
organize employees of a European multinational firm. Instead of filing an 
OECD complaint, though, UNITE's Swedish trade union allies met with 
management and laid on the table what a Brylane-style campaign would 
look like, starting with OECD complaint using the Swedish government's 
contact point. To avoid such a bitter exchange, H&M management agreed 
to respect its U.S. employees' organizing rights through a card-
check/neutrality system similar to that agreed to by PPR. A majority of 
workers at an H&M distribution center quickly joined the union, gained 
recognition, and negotiated a favorable collective bargaining agreement. 
V. SOME CLOSING OBSERVATIONS 
The First Student, Brylane and other strategic campaign cases 
summarized here provide examples of collective actions by U.S. and 
European unions to make Europe-based corporations live up to their 
commitments on freedom of association. With some variations, the same 
tactics can apply against any European company that resists workers' 
organizing and bargaining. Note, however, that these unions' campaigns 
fall short of "industrial action" in the classic sense that was contemplated in 
the Trico Marine, Coastal Stevedoring, and UPS cases. They involved 
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public statements, press conferences, rallies, leafleting, political pressure, 
shareholder actions, labor-management meetings, and other tactics, but 
never reached a point of primary or secondary strikes, picketing, 
slowdowns, or other methods of industrial action strictly defined. 
A. Two Trade Union Cultures 
A not-so-secret tension between U.S. and European unions limits the 
possibility for outright industrial action against European firms. The 
tension arises from differing labor management cultures and histories. In 
Europe, "social dialogue" is the industrial relations watchword. Unions and 
management resolve their differences in "peak" bargaining contexts at a 
national level. The same peak bargaining model applies at a Europe-wide 
level in the case of E.U. directives susceptible to negotiations between the 
European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) and BusinessEurope -
formerly UNICE, the pan-European management group. 
Many European unionists who see fruitful dialogue with top corporate 
officials think their U.S. counterparts go too far with what they see as the 
latter's overly confrontational, company-bashing campaigns and 
expectations that European unions should be equally belligerent in attacking 
management. European union leaders will go so far as to distribute 
literature and put some members in front of corporate headquarters holding 
signs, but they see their real point of influence in private meetings with top 
company officials to persuade them to rein in their U.S. managers.36 
Many U.S. trade unionists are skeptical about "social dialogue" in the 
United States. They would take the European model if they could get it. 
But they are more likely to believe that most management in U.S. firms, 
whether domestic or foreign-owned, detest unions and will stop at nothing 
to thwart them, making "dialogue" with management impossible. Instead, 
U.S. union activists feel compelled to be equally aggressive in standing up 
to management power. They fear that their European comrades are too 
invested in social dialogue and dangerously deluding themselves that 
management at home would not, given the chance, be as union busting as 
their U.S. managers. 
U.S.-style anti-unionism is making inroads in Europe, more in the 
United Kingdom to date than on the continent. Several U.S. consultant 
groups that specialize in stifling workers' organizing efforts have opened 
shop in Britain and introduced captive-audience meetings, one-on-one 
36. A contrary view might point to NOPEF's willingness to boycott Trico Marine's North Sea 
operations. But one plausible explanation for the case settling at the last hour was NOPEF's 
ambivalence about the boycott. 
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supervisor-employee pressure tactics, scaremongering about strikes and the 
"dangers" of collective bargaining, and other hallmarks of U.S.-style 
unionbusting.37 As this tendency expands, the two union styles might 
converge, with European trade unions becoming more aggressive in 
defending their interests. Such a convergence might bridge the cultural 
differences and put classic forms of industrial action back in the game in 
organizing and bargaining disputes involving European companies in the 
United States. 
B. A Research and Strategy Agenda 
We have examined several case studies of efforts to compel companies 
doing business in the United States to live up to commitments to comply 
with international labor standards. We have categorized these approaches 
into either efforts to persuade foreign unions to engage in job actions 
designed to pressure targeted employers or strategic campaigns joined by 
foreign unions and others. While there is little in U.S. labor law to enforce 
such commitments (with the possible exception of contract or tort law), the 
case studies suggest U.S. unions have tried a variety of approaches to 
enforce international standards, with varying degrees of success. 
There have been enough such efforts to begin to evaluate the results. 
How do the case studies we have examined as well as other examples help 
us answer the following questions: 
• What were the most successful efforts and why did they succeed? 
• What were some of the principal challenges faced? 
• What kinds of campaigns, issues, and strategies seem to be the 
most/least promising? 
• What are the circumstances or contexts that seem to be the 
most/least promising? 
• What are the issues that are most likely to win international 
support? 
• Which international standards, if implemented, are likely to make 
the most difference in domestic organizing campaigns? 
• Whose support should U.S. unions seek to enlist? 
• Counterpart unions abroad? 
• Domestic and/or international trade union federations? 
• Political structures/leaders (executive, legislative, administrative)? 
37. See generally JOHN LOGAN, U.S. ANTI-UNION CONSULTANTS: A THREAT TO THE RIGHTS OF 
BRITISH WORKERS (2010), http://www.lotidningen.se/media/lotidningen/media/dokument/vt2008/logan 
report.pdf. 
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• NGOs? 
• Others? 
• What are the best approaches to building such relationships and 
winning active/effective support? 
• Does new technology (Internet, social media etc.) create 
opportunities for new forms of industrial "cyberactions"?38 
What seems clear is that the implementation of international labor 
standards has been a factor in the success of several U.S. campaigns. It 
seems worth the effort to better understand their full potential and 
limitations. 
38. See, e.g., ERIC LEE, THE LABOUR MOVEMENT AND THE INTERNET: THE NEW 
INTERNATIONALISM (1997) (groundbreaking work); THE CYBERUNION HANDBOOK: TRANSFORMING 
LABOR THROUGH COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY (Arthur B. Shostak, ed., 2002); LABOURSTART, 
www.laborstart.org (last visited June 5, 2012); CYBERUNIONS: BUILDING A FREE SOFTWARE LABOUR 
MOVEMENT, http://cyberunions.org (last visited June 5, 2012). 
